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Comment: WYSIATI and False
Confessions
Michael R. Hoernlein
Truth is tough. It will not break like a bubble, at a touch; nay,
you may kick it all day like a football, and it will be round
and full at evening. – Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.

INTRODUCTION
Decades after the Supreme Court mandated in Miranda v.
Arizona1 that police advise suspects of their constitutional
rights before custodial interrogation, confusion remains about
the contours of the rule, and some law enforcement officers still
try to game the system. In his excellent Note, “No Earlier
Confession to Repeat”: Seibert, Dixon, and Question-First
Interrogations, Lee Brett presents a careful analysis of the legal
landscape applicable to so-called question-first interrogations.
Mr. Brett offers a compelling argument urging courts not to
interpret Bobby v. Dixon2 as limiting the application of Missouri
v. Seibert3 to two-step (i.e., question-first) interrogations only
when there’s an “earlier confession to repeat.”
Mr. Brett does an excellent job explaining and analyzing
Dixon, Seibert, and how they fit into the Miranda framework.
The Supreme Court should, as Mr. Brett suggests, step in to
provide much-needed clarity for lower courts and law
enforcement. Until then, defense lawyers should continue to
challenge midstream warnings.
I’m a little biased about this topic: I was one of the lawyers
representing Bobby Johnson in petitioning the United States
1.
2.
3.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
565 U.S. 23 (2011) (per curiam).
542 U.S. 600 (2004).
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Supreme Court to review his case, which was the backdrop for
Mr. Brett’s Note.4 Mr. Brett has done such an outstanding job
that there’s not much left for me to say about those legal issues.
So, I’d like to use this opportunity to explore false confessions
and how the field of behavioral economics—specifically, the
phenomenon that psychologist Daniel Kahneman dubs
WYSIATI (What You See Is All There Is)—can help explain false
confessions and the convictions they produce.
I.

FALSE CONFESSIONS

I’ve watched the video of Bobby Johnson’s interrogation
many times. Not only do I believe that the detectives
deliberately flouted Miranda and Seibert when they questioned
Mr. Johnson, but I also believe that they elicited a false
confession.
The Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination
wasn’t rooted in a concern for ensuring reliability or protecting
innocent people from making false confessions; it was first and
foremost intended to protect the integrity of a person’s free will
against government intrusion. Over time, regard for the
reliability of confessions grew as a factor in how courts
understood the Fifth Amendment. Courts have recognized for
some time that a suspect might falsely confess to a crime. For
example, the Supreme Court noted in Miranda that
“[i]nterrogation procedures may even give rise to a false
confession.”5
In recent years, the proliferation of true-crime
documentaries, movies, tv shows, and podcasts have shone a
spotlight on the prevalence of false confessions.6 As more and
more police departments across the country have started
recording interrogations on video, we’ve had unprecedented
4. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Johnson v. North
Carolina, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019) (No. 18-1542).
5. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455 n.24.
6. See, e.g., PARADISE LOST: THE CHILD MURDERS AT ROBIN HOOD HILLS
(Home Box Office 1996), THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE (Sundance Selects 2012),
Making a Murderer (Synthesis Films 2015), The Confession Tapes (A24 2017),
When They See Us (Harpo Films 2019), and The Innocent Man (Campfire
2018).
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visibility into what happens in interrogation rooms before
suspects incriminate themselves. And as DNA evidence has led
to exonerations of many wrongfully convicted defendants, it’s
become impossible to ignore the role that false confessions can
play in sending the wrong people to prison.
The jury is no longer out (so to speak): Under the right
conditions, psychologically coercive interrogations can lead
innocent people to lie about committing crimes in which they
didn’t participate at all—sometimes terrible, almost
unimaginable, crimes. Still, it remains very difficult for the
average person to accept that a suspect would implicate himself
in a crime that he had nothing to do with—which makes it a
particularly fascinating phenomenon.
And a tragic one: Often the suspects who falsely confess are
just children or have some form of emotional or intellectual
deficit. In some of the more outrageous cases, police and
prosecutors secured convictions of not just one innocent person
but multiple innocent people—usually with no physical
evidence tying any of them to the crime. Their nicknames have
become synonymous with wrongful convictions based on false
convictions: The West Memphis Three, the Norfolk Four, the
Central Park Five, the Beatrice Six.
Sometimes, interrogations are so effective—not at getting
at the truth but at manipulating the suspect—that suspects
start to believe that they must have committed the crime. They
might even develop false memories through repeated,
manipulative interrogation sessions.
Fortunately, DNA evidence occasionally proves the true
perpetrator’s identity and exonerates the wrongfully convicted.
But when faced with contrary physical evidence, prosecutors
often change their theory to account for a new suspect: Sure the
guy whose DNA is all over the scene was obviously involved, but
that doesn’t mean all the others were innocent. They just
managed to avoid leaving any trace. The prosecutors modify
their narrative to incorporate the new evidence without revising
their underlying theory, which usually requires some creative—
or fanciful—speculation. That resistance to admitting the
mistake and getting the justice train back on the tracks can rob
the wrongfully accused of many additional years of freedom.
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False confessions tend to reflect common themes:
questioning that goes on for hours in a small, strategically
arranged room with no window; an isolated suspect with a poor
understanding of his rights; interrogators who get in the
suspect’s face, accuse him relentlessly of having committed the
crime, lie about the available evidence, threaten him with a long
prison sentence or death, offer to put in a good word with the
district attorney, and suggest possible explanations for the
crime to minimize the suspect’s culpability. That’s no
coincidence—that’s the playbook. The goal isn’t to gather
information: since the questioner already believes that the
suspect is guilty, the goal is to wear down the suspect until he
confesses.
II.

WYSIATI

There’s an extensive (and increasingly sophisticated) body
of scholarship on the factors that contribute to false confessions.
The field of behavioral economics offers useful principles for
making sense of such confessions.
One key concept that sheds light on the dynamics of false
confessions is WYSIATI, a term that psychologist and Nobel
Prize winner Daniel Kahneman coined in his breakthrough
book Thinking, Fast and Slow.7 WYSIATI is a powerful feature
of human psychology that often leads people to jump to incorrect
conclusions. It can lead investigators away from the truth, make
false confessions more likely, and induce a judge or jury to
embrace a false narrative that conflicts with other available
evidence.
An understanding of WYSIATI requires a brief introduction
to Kahneman’s project. Kahneman illuminates the mechanisms
of human judgment and decision making using the framework
of what psychologists refer to as System 1 (the part of the mind
that “operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort
and no sense of voluntary control”)8 and System 2 (the slower,

7.
8.

See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 86 (2011).
Id. at 20.
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deliberative part that handles more “effortful mental
activities”).9
Navigating our complex world requires us to think fast. We
can’t analyze everything that confronts us in our day-to-day
lives. Simple tasks would quickly overwhelm us. System 1
facilitates daily life by generating automatic impressions and
intuitions that allow us to make sense of the world around us
and that, in general, serve as a sound basis for belief and action.
As Kahneman explains, System 1 allows us to do things like
compute 2 + 2, read a billboard, detect anger in someone’s voice,
think of Paris when someone mentions the capital of France.
Those come to us automatically—in fact, it’s almost impossible
to shield ourselves from the immediate impressions that arise
when we encounter the expression “2 + 2”, a billboard, an angry
voice, or mention of the capital of France.
Sometimes, though, we need to engage the slower System 2
for heavier mental lifting. System 2 takes care of a wide variety
of attention-intensive tasks, like multiplying 13 by 27, focusing
on a particular voice in a noisy room, filling out a tax form, or
telling someone our phone number. Those tasks are not
automatic—they require effort.
System 1 turns out to be prone to specific kinds of
systematic errors. And one key aspect of System 1 is that it
“excels at constructing the best possible story that incorporates
ideas currently activated [in associative memory], but it does
not (and cannot) allow for information it does not have.”10 In
other words, WYSIATI is System 1’s tendency to “jump[] to
conclusions on the basis of limited evidence.”11
To illustrate how WYSIATI works, Kahneman offers an
example: “‘Will Mindik be a good leader? She is intelligent and
strong . . . .’ An answer quickly came to your mind, and it was
yes. You picked the best answer based on the very limited
information available, but you jumped the gun. What if the next
two adjectives were corrupt and cruel?”12

9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 21.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 85.
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With the first two bits of information about Mindik (that
she’s intelligent and strong), most people can’t help but think of
an answer instead of withholding judgment until more
information becomes available. Although the answer might
change as we learn more about Mindik (and even if we’re aware
that we have limited information), there’s a bias in favor of
accepting System 1’s initial impression.
As Kahneman puts it, “The measure of success for System
1 is the coherence of the story it manages to create. The amount
and quality of the data on which the story is based are largely
irrelevant.”13 That statement goes a long way toward explaining
how people think.
It’s easier to connect fewer dots than more dots. So, the less
information we have, the easier it is to construct a story with
narrative integrity. But coherence alone shouldn’t be enough for
us—we want to be right. We want the truth. And a narrative
that not only has internal coherence but is also true will be able
to accommodate any reliable evidence that it runs up against.
As Justice Holmes’s father noted, “Truth is tough. It will not
break, like a bubble, at a touch; nay, you may kick it about all
day, like a football, and it will be round and full at evening.”14
When investigators and prosecutors try to shield their narrative
from additional evidence, fearing that it might “break . . . like a
bubble,” it’s a major red flag.
Those initial impressions and intuitions that arise in the
early stages of a case can impede efforts to uncover the truth,
since System 1 is “radically insensitive to both the quality and
the quantity of the information that gives rise to impressions
and intuitions.”15
WYSIATI also helps explain many cognitive biases that can
lead us away from the truth and toward an “alternative” version
of reality. A few salient examples are:

13. Id.
14. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE PROFESSOR AT THE BREAKFAST TABLE
109 (1859).
15. KAHNEMAN, supra note 7, at 86.
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overconfidence

faith in intuition, blindness to missing
information, “fed by the illusory
certainty of hindsight”16
framing effects
being swayed by the way information is
presented to us
confirmation bias
seeking (or crediting) evidence that
supports a preexisting view and
ignoring (or discounting) contrary
evidence
availability bias
magnifying more recent or more
memorable events or information
These biases (and others) operate on us even when we know
that we’re susceptible to them.

III. WYSIATI AND INVESTIGATORS
It’s not hard to see how WYSIATI and cognitive biases can
infect investigations. An investigation is an iterative process of
acquiring knowledge. It requires gathering and analyzing
evidence over time, usually beginning with a limited set of
information or allegations.
Impressions and intuitions can be helpful—especially if
they’re based on extensive experience—but they’re no substitute
for careful evaluation of evidence by System 2.
From an investigation’s inception, the investigator’s mind
automatically starts crafting a coherent narrative using the
limited information available. System 1 doesn’t wait until
there’s enough evidence that’s adequately tested for reliability.
It synthesizes whatever’s available—no matter how meager or
unreliable—and constructs the best narrative that it can
without regard to all the unknowns. WYSIATI kicks in even
though the investigator is missing pieces and knows it. Again,
System 1 is “radically insensitive to both the quality and the
quantity of [available] information.”17
The danger is in allowing those initial impressions and
intuitions from System 1 to harden into conclusions
prematurely; jumping to conclusions can steer an investigation
16.
17.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 86.
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in the wrong direction. The seed of many wrongful convictions
is planted when inept investigators “go with their gut.” A
detective might think, The husband did it. He’s acting
suspicious. There was no sign of forced entry. And the couple had
been arguing in recent days. I’ve seen this a hundred times. That
seed might then get fertilized (so to speak) with some junk
science, questionable eyewitnesses, creative speculation . . . and
on and on.
Good investigators have a well-developed System 2 that
doesn’t just rubberstamp System 1. They methodically assess
the available evidence, look for new evidence, reevaluate the
situation, test their hypotheses periodically, and remain willing
to scrap a theory that is too fragile when new facts are injected.
Bad investigators, on the other hand, get hung up on initial
impressions, seek out information that supports their preferred
narrative, ignore contrary evidence, and use speculation to fill
in gaps and resolve apparent inconsistencies.
IV. WYSIATI AND SUSPECTS
During an interrogation of a suspect believed to be guilty,
an investigator who is determined to extract a confession can
use WYSIATI against the suspect. The interrogator isolates the
suspect in the interrogation room, cutting off his access to
information. The interrogator selectively highlights facts about
the crime. The interrogator supplements the facts with lies
(“your buddy says you pulled the trigger,” or “your prints were
all over the knife,” or “you failed the polygraph test.”).
With those cherry-picked ideas active in associative
memory—without regard to the quality of the information—the
suspect’s System 1 generates impressions of the suspect’s
situation, leaving it to System 2 to sort everything out and lead
the suspect to a conclusion about what to do.
As the interrogation drags on, the suspect’s stress level
skyrockets and fatigue sets in. The suspect’s System 2 falters
and produces a twisted cost-benefit analysis: They don’t believe
me. They’ll never believe me. They have evidence that will convict
me. I want to get out of here now. I’m better off giving them what
they want. Since I know I didn’t do it, they’ll realize it too before
this goes too far.
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V.

WYSIATI AND JURORS

Fast forward to the jury trial. The judge will tell the jury
that the indictment is just a set of allegations, that the
defendant is innocent until proven guilty, that the government
has the burden of convincing the jury of the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
But what data points are available to the jury? As the trial
begins, all the jurors know is that the government charged this
defendant with committing that crime. What they see is all
there is. In the absence of any other information, each juror’s
System 1 says, “He probably did it.” It’s up to System 2 to say,
“Not so fast. We don’t have any evidence yet.”
Before and during trial, the defense and the prosecution
will fight over what evidence the judge should allow to come in
and what evidence should be excluded. For example, in Bobby
Johnson’s case, the defense was unsuccessful at excluding the
post-Miranda interrogation. On the other hand, the prosecution
successfully excluded the pre-Miranda portion of the
interrogation. The jury only saw part of the video and didn’t see
the first four or five hours, in which Bobby denied any
involvement, cried, and banged his head on the table.
The rules of evidence include very blunt tools for judges to
control the information flow to the jury. If a false confession is
introduced, it’s pretty much game over. Judges and juries give
confessions tremendous weight, often to the complete exclusion
of everything else. Many exonerees were convicted based on
confessions where no physical evidence implicated them. Even
a confession that is totally implausible, that includes
inconsistent claims, that flies in the face of physical evidence—
including DNA evidence—can be hard for juries to discount.
CONCLUSION
We can’t shut System 1 off at will. But if we care about the
truth, we can temper System 1’s effects with a robust sense of
humility. We should be self-aware about the limits of our ability
to acquire knowledge and about our susceptibility to cognitive
biases. And we should recognize our fallibility and our tendency
to be led astray.
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Defendants in criminal cases have important protections in
this country. Some are enshrined explicitly in the Bill of Rights:
the right against self-incrimination, right to confront witnesses,
right to trial by an impartial jury, right to counsel. Some are
implicit, like the presumption of innocence and the
reasonable-doubt standard.
But those safeguards can be effective only if we understand
and apply them in a way that accounts for what we know about
how people actually think. Legislators at the state and federal
level should continue seeking ways to update our laws to reflect
the current state of scientific knowledge. Courts should
calibrate procedural rules and individual rulings—for example,
on evidentiary questions and jury instructions—to how people
actually form judgments and make decisions in the real world.
And prosecutors and police should foster cultures of humility,
flexibility, and accountability to guard against securing and
relying on false confessions.

